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This study investigated the age at which children judge it futile to imitate unreliable information, in the
form of a visibly ineffective demonstrated solution, and deviate to produce novel solutions (‘innova-
tions’). Children aged 4–9 years were presented with a novel puzzle box, the Multiple-Methods
Box (MMB), which offered multiple innovation opportunities to extract a reward using different tools,
access points and exits. 209 children were assigned to conditions in which eight social demonstrations
of a reward retrieval method were provided; each condition differed incrementally in terms of the meth-
od’s efﬁcacy (0%, 25%, 75%, and 100% success at extracting the reward). An additional 47 children were
assigned to a no-demonstration control condition. Innovative reward extractions from the MMB
increased with decreasing efﬁcacy of the demonstrated method. However, imitation remained a widely
used strategy irrespective of the efﬁcacy of the method being reproduced (90% of children produced at
least one imitative attempt, and imitated on an average of 4.9 out of 8 attempt trials). Children were more
likely to innovate in relation to the tool than exit, even though the latter would have been more effective.
Overall, innovation was rare: only 12.4% of children innovated by discovering at least one novel reward
exit. Children’s prioritisation of social information is consistent with theories of cultural evolution indi-
cating imitation is a prepotent response following observation of behaviour, and that innovation is a rar-
ity; so much so, that even maladaptive behaviour is copied.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Social learning provides the foundation for culture. Acquiring
information through observation is a rapid, cheap and largely efﬁ-
cient way to learn. Yet, on occasion, social information is outdated
or inappropriate, especially in changing environments; thus its use
must be modulated to support accurate and reliable information
acquisition (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002).
Accordingly, personal sampling of the environment, even if costly,
is a necessity (Laland, 2004). Theoretical models have suggested
many learning heuristics (cultural transmission biases; Boyd &
Richerson, 1985 and social learning strategies; Laland, 2004) which
enable selectivity in social learning. These heuristics help direct
whom, when and what we copy by inducing accuracy-cost evalu-
ations of observed and personal information and, in turn, adaptivetrade-offs in reliance on social and asocial (individual) learning
(Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2009; Kendal, Coolen, van Bergen, &
Laland, 2005).
Adaptive informational trade-offs have been shown in a variety
of non-human animals (including species of ﬁsh, rats, monkeys and
birds; see Galef & Laland, 2005; Kendal et al., 2009). By pitting
social and personal information against one another, it appears
that, ‘animals use social information primarily as plan B, or a
backup when personal information is too costly to obtain, unreli-
able or outdated’ (Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2011, p. 950). In van
Bergen, Coolen, and Laland (2004), three groups of nine-spined
stickleback ﬁsh were provided with personal information that var-
ied in its level of reliability (56%, 78% or 100% reliable). This infor-
mation related to the proﬁtability of food patches within the
experimental tank, and was determined by the number of trials
in which ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ feeders could be accessed. A social (‘pub-
lic’) demonstration then provided conﬂicting information as to the
location of the rich feeder. In spite of this demonstration, a signif-
icant number of sticklebacks within the 100% group (19 of 23) con-
tinued to visit the feeder they had personally experienced as rich,
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Bergen, Coolen, and Laland (2004), in the current study we manip-
ulated information reliability with the aim of observing adaptive
trade-offs in learning. However, given children’s proclivity for imi-
tation, and apparent tendency to collect social information despite
possessing adequate personal information (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn,
2013a), we did so by manipulating the reliability of social
information.
Children are exceptional imitators from a young age, reproduc-
ing behaviour with high levels of ﬁdelity across contexts
(Matheson, Moore, & Akhtar, 2013) and in the absence of causal
knowledge of its relevancy (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). Indeed,
they are deemed ‘cultural magnets’ (Flynn, 2008) in their ability
to both rapidly acquire and transmit information socially (Flynn
& Whiten, 2008; Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010).
However, children are not blind to the quality of information they
observe. By altering the frequency and ﬁdelity with which they
imitate, in line with the perceived goal of a demonstration
(Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, &
Tomasello, 2005), model reliability and intentionality (Birch,
Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998),
task difﬁculty and prior experience (Gardiner, Bjorklund, Greif, &
Gray, 2012; Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011; Williamson & Meltzoff,
2011; Wood et al., 2013a), children display rationality and ﬂexibil-
ity in their social learning (Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013;
Over & Carpenter, 2012).
A variety of factors, including context, model characteristics and
information content, affect the use of social information (Rendell
et al., 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013b); here, our focus is on
the efﬁcacy of the information content. Action efﬁcacy should
arguably be a foremost determinant of what (and if) we choose
to copy. By 3 years of age children distinguish correct from incor-
rect actions in their imitative behaviour, only reproducing those
that have a desired causal effect (Want & Harris, 2001). Further,
prior personal difﬁculty with a task does not induce 3-year-olds
to have a copy-all approach when non-efﬁcacious acts are demon-
strated (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008). If a causal rela-
tionship is unknown, faithful imitation may result. However, if
action sequences are repeatedly poor at producing desired out-
comes, their efﬁcacy should be questioned and imitation less likely
to occur. Thus, logically, in circumstances under which a sequence
of behaviour is never or rarely effective at achieving a goal, individ-
uals should try new methods.
Few studies have attempted to examine how evaluations of efﬁ-
cacy affect selective imitation, and subsequent novel action pro-
duction (or innovation). Schulz, Hooppell, and Jenkins (2008)
tested 18-month-olds and 4-year-olds in conditions that differed
in an action’s efﬁcacy: deterministic, in which the actions activated
the toy on all trials and stochastic, in which actions activated the
toy on 50% of trials. Children of both age groups imitated with sig-
niﬁcantly lower ﬁdelity in the stochastic condition than the deter-
ministic condition, irrespective of whether the action satisﬁed the
explicitly stated goal of the model. Thus, in the stochastic condi-
tion, efﬁcacy overrides pedagogy. However, as Schulz et al.
(2008) acknowledge, the potential for alternative responses on
the task, and the opportunity to observe behavioural innovation,
was limited.
In recent years, interest in childhood innovation has grown, and
studies suggest that, in the tool-use domain, innovation is a rela-
tively late-developing capacity (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie,
& Cutting, 2011; Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call, 2011; Nielsen,
2013) and a rare response for children (Whiten & Flynn, 2010).
Factors such as functional ﬁxedness (German & Defeyter, 2000),
explicit instruction (Bonawitz et al., 2011), prior social information
(Wood et al., 2013a), and task structure (Cutting, Apperly,
Chappell, & Beck, 2014) likely constrain it. Innovation can bedelineated in terms of arising from asocial learning (innovation
by independent invention) or a combination of asocial and social
learning (innovation by modiﬁcation; Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, under
revision). Most research investigating children’s innovation has
examined novel tool invention as opposed to novel modiﬁcation.
Yet, examination of the latter is critical as it is of great importance
for cumulative culture (Lewis & Laland, 2012), where, over genera-
tions, humans build upon and improve pre-existing knowledge
(Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012). Currently we
do not knowwhether innovation by modiﬁcation has the same late
developmental trajectory as independent invention. The current
study addresses this issue through the provision of social demon-
strations to individual children, across the age range of 4–9 years,
followed by multiple response trials, thus providing many oppor-
tunities for innovation as well as multiple tools with which to
innovate.
We ask, when evaluating efﬁcacy of observed actions, at which
point do children judge it futile to imitate? Do we see different
assessments of redundancy at different ages? And does varying
action efﬁcacy make children more likely to innovate (produce
novel behaviour) when given sufﬁcient opportunity and means to
do so? Even if children do not know of a behavioural alternative,
they should nevertheless explore novel actions (Schulz et al.,
2008) – trading-off social information for potentially more reliable
personal information.
Our study used a novel artiﬁcial fruit (Whiten, Custance,
Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996), the Multiple-Methods
Box (MMB), a puzzle box offering scope for exploration and inno-
vation (we distinguish exploration and innovation here as they
are regarded as qualitatively distinct (Reader & Laland, 2003):
you may explore, but you may not always innovate). Drawing from
van Bergen et al. (2004), children were provided with social
demonstrations that differed in solution efﬁcacy: the proportion
of trials (0%, 25%, 75%, 100%) that a reward could be extracted from
the exit door of the MMB. Multiple demonstration and attempt tri-
als were provided to reduce the likelihood that the novel task and
experimental context would incite a copy-when-uncertain bias
(Laland, 2004) and to monitor if, and how, participants changed
their reliance on social and/or personal information over trials
(Flynn & Smith, 2012; Wood et al., 2013a). With increasing experi-
ence with the MMB, both through observation and personal use,
participants could establish the demonstrated method’s efﬁcacy
and, in the lower efﬁcacy conditions, appreciate the redundancy
of repeating a method that simply did not work.
Children aged 4–9 years were selected so as to capture develop-
mental change and is in keeping with that of previous innovation
research (Beck et al., 2011). Moreover, children are adept at assess-
ing efﬁcacy by 4 years (Want & Harris, 2001; Williamson et al.,
2008) and able to differentiate information that is reliable 75% of
the time from information that is reliable 25% of the time
(Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). We predicted, in line
with Want and Harris (2001) and Schulz et al. (2008), that lower
levels of solution efﬁcacy would be associated with reduced imita-
tion (lowered ﬁdelity to the socially demonstrated method), and,
further, increased innovation (speciﬁcally, innovations that altered
the reward exit and thus allowed for extraction). Moreover, we
anticipated that older children would be better equipped to both
evaluate levels of solution efﬁcacy (resulting in a stronger negative
relationship between efﬁcacy and innovation with increasing age)
and reach effective innovative solutions (with the greatest rates of
successful innovation being seen in the oldest age group). In turn,
we predicted that, overall, the oldest children would be the least
faithful to the socially demonstrated method. Finally, given the
range of novel behaviours that could be produced with the MMB,
we explore how participants deviated from the socially demon-
strated method (if and when they did) with regard to whether they
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assessed the children’s performance against the performance of
adults, whom we predicted should innovate, particularly in the
lowest efﬁcacy condition.2. Method
2.1. Participants
Two hundred and ﬁfty-six children (128 males) from three pri-
mary schools in the North East of England participated. Three age
groups were created: 4–5 years (N = 73, M = 5 years 4 months
(5;4), range 4;8–5;11), 6–7 years (N = 96, M = 7;0, range 6;0–
7;10), and 8–9 years (N = 87, M = 8;10, range 8;0–9;9). Forty-ﬁve
Durham University students also participated (23 male,
M = 20 years 7 months (20;7), range 18;6–27;7).
2.2. Materials
A novel puzzle box task, the ‘Multiple-Methods Box’ (MMB; see
Fig. 1), was used. The MMB contains two levels separated by an
opaque platform. The upper transparent level featured: an entry
chute for a reward (a capsule containing a sticker which was
inserted by the experimenter); four entrances, one of which
required the rotation of a dial for access and three of which could
also function as reward extraction points; and a small circular hole
in the platform ﬂoor. If the capsule was manipulated to fall through
this hole (as in the social demonstrations) it dropped to a lower
opaque level of the MMB via a concealed slope to rest behind a blue
exit door. A small independent remote control device was used to
discretely lock and unlock the exit door in line with predetermined
levels of solution efﬁcacy. When unlocked the door could be lifted
to acquire the capsule from behind.
Three tools were available: a fork, a hook and a sweep tool
(Fig. 1b). The varying dimensions of both the MMB and the tools
introduced an additional problem solving component to the task
by limiting random application of the tools; that is, not all tools ﬁt-
ted into all access points or were long enough to manipulate the
capsule to all exit holes. Further, the fork and sweep tool could
be joined and used in combination to extract the reward across a
longer distance than the other single tools. The social demonstra-
tion involved inserting the fork tool into the smaller invertedHole in platform floor, 
leading to exit door 
(circled, below left)
2
4
3
5
(a)
Fig. 1. The Multiple-Methods Box (MMB) and associated tools. (a) Access points labelle
large inverted T-shape, opposite ‘Social’, (3) ‘Dial’, circular hole, revealed by aligning the
Chute’, a circular hole into which the reward was dropped. (b) Three tools were availabl
each tool demonstrates the main method of manoeuvre. The fork and sweep tool coul
affording extraction across the full length of the MMB, and can be seen in the reﬂectionT-shaped entrance (labelled 1 in Fig. 1), the reward was caught
in the ‘U’ of the fork and manoeuvred so that it fell through the
hole in the platform ﬂoor.
2.3. Design
Children from each age group were randomly allocated to one
of four social experimental conditions, differing incrementally in
the efﬁcacy of the demonstrated method of reward extraction.
The method itself was consistent across all demonstrations and
conditions. Method efﬁcacy was operationalised as the number
of demonstration trials, out of eight, in which the capsule could
be removed from the exit door. The method was efﬁcacious on
either 0 of 8 trials (0% condition, N = 60), 2 of 8 trials (25% condi-
tion, N = 48), 6 of 8 trials (75% condition, N = 50) or 8 of 8 trials
(100% condition, N = 51). Importantly, the level of method efﬁcacy
observed during the experimenter’s demonstrations was mirrored
in participants’ own subsequent attempts with the task, such that
their personal experience with the MMB matched their observa-
tional experience (if they chose to reproduce the demonstrated
behaviour). A further 47 children were assigned to a
no-demonstration control condition in which they witnessed no
social demonstrations (see Table 1 for the distribution of partici-
pants across groups). This condition provided a baseline measure
of performance on the task, speciﬁcally the level of performance
of the actions presented within the social demonstration and the
level of new method generation without prior method demonstra-
tion. The adult participants were allocated to either the 0% or 75%
efﬁcacy condition as it was here that major differences were seen
in the child sample.
2.4. Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet area of their school.
First, they were familiarised with the MMB during a short
warm-up phase. To attempt to reduce assumed experimenter
expertise and potential model-based biases (Wood, Kendal, &
Flynn, 2012), the box was proclaimed as belonging to a friend,
‘‘This is actually my friend’s box, and my friend told me that when
this egg [the capsule] goes into the box you have to try and get it
out. Inside this egg is a sticker. If you get it out of the box, we
can start a sticker pile for you and we’ll see how many you can1
(b)
d 1–5: (1) ‘Social’, small inverted T-shape, used in social demonstrations, (2) ‘End’,
circle of a dial with a circle in the side of the box, (4) ‘Dial Opposite’, and (5) ‘Entry
e, from right to left: fork, hook and sweep. The position of the capsule in relation to
d be joined and used in combination to extract the reward, with the extra length
at the base of the box (a).
Table 1
Distribution of participants across the experimental conditions and age groups.
Baseline 0% 25% 75% 100% Total
4–5 yrs 14(8) 17(9) 14(7) 15(9) 13(8) 73(41)
6–7 yrs 18(9) 20(11) 18(10) 19(9) 21(11) 96(50)
8–9 yrs 15(8) 23(10) 16(7) 16(6) 17(6) 87(37)
Total 47(25) 60(30) 48(24) 50(24) 51(25) 256(128)
Note. Number of males given in parentheses.
1 This is in essence ‘end-state emulation’ (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, &
Hopper, 2009). However, as the end state was manipulated to produce method
efﬁcacy, it was not possible to investigate the development of end-state emulation in
and of itself.
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by enquiring into the name of the friend. The tools were presented
alongside the box: ‘‘Can you see these tools here? My friend also
told me that some of these tools can be joined together’’.
Children in the no-demonstration control condition received a
prompt to begin interacting with the MMB immediately following
this familiarisation: ‘‘You can have some turns at seeing if you can
get the egg out of the box. You can do anything you like.’’ The exit
door was unlocked throughout for control participants, and up to
ﬁve tool insertions permitted per attempt. Children in the social
conditions were informed: ‘‘I’m going to have eight turns at trying
to get the egg out of the box. Let’s see if it works’’. The experi-
menter proceeded to demonstrate the same method of reward
retrieval (fork tool through ‘Social’ access point, capsule to exit
door via hole in ﬂoor) eight times with only the outcome differing
between the four experimental groups. Neutral comments, ‘‘I got it
out of the box/I didn’t get it out of the box’’, were made after each
demonstration. As the concealed exit chute connecting the circular
hole in the upper platform ﬂoor and the lower exit door was cap-
able of holding eight capsules, it was not necessary to remove
‘locked’ capsules in between experimenter demonstrations.
However, for those conditions in which locked capsules had to be
removed prior to participants’ attempts (0–75% conditions), chil-
dren were distracted with a non-cognitively demanding task
(organising sheets of stickers) for the very short time (<10 s) it took
to remove these capsules.
Participants were given a maximum of eight attempt trials, over
a period of ﬁve minutes (if the eight trials were not completed
within this time, which was rare, testing ceased). Participants
who had received social demonstrations were told, ‘‘Now it’s your
turn to see if you can get the egg out of the box. You can do any-
thing you like’’. Each trial constituted one participant’s attempt,
for which strict criteria were applied. An attempt was deﬁned as
the insertion of a tool into the box with the purposeful intention,
or realisation, of making contact with the capsule prior to the tool’s
extraction. ‘Purposeful’ denotes engagement with the task as indi-
cated by head and gaze orientation and ‘intention’ evidenced when
a tool was fully inserted but too short to reach the capsule. An
attempt was complete when a tool was fully extracted (even if
then replaced into the same access point). Some innovative meth-
ods of reward retrieval involved performing more than one action
– for example, pushing the capsule with the fork tool towards the
‘End’ of the MMB before using the hook tool to extract it. In the
event that a child displayed continued purposeful intentionality
and interaction with the MMB, therefore, this was considered part
of the same attempt. The apparatus was re-baited upon commenc-
ing each trial, unless full contact with the capsule was not previ-
ously made or the capsule was moved only a very small distance.
The removal of the lid of the box, concealed by a large fabric sheet,
allowed capsules to be quickly retrieved in the event of their
unsuccessful extraction. As with demonstrations, neutral com-
ments were made following each attempt trial (‘‘You got it out of
the box/You didn’t get it out of the box’’).
For comparability, and to control for primacy and recency
effects, the demonstration sequence of the two conditionsinvolving uncertainty (25% and 75%) began and ended with a suc-
cess (S, door unlocked) followed by an unsuccess (U, door locked).
The full demonstration sequence for the 25% condition was thus: S,
U, U, U, U, U, S, U, and for the 75% condition: S, U, S, S, S, S, S, U. The
same sequences were implemented for participants’ subsequent
attempts with the MMB. In this attempts phase, the experimenter
ensured only one capsule was extracted on those occasions in
which the exit door was unlocked and additional capsules had
accumulated in the exit chute. Whilst recognising that it would
not always be feasible to fully mirror the efﬁcacy of demonstrated
social information in participants’ attempts, given that different
numbers of the socially demonstrated method could be attempted
prior to the enactment of alternative methods, at the very least
participants were given some experience of efﬁcacy variability in
their ﬁrst two trials (i.e., success followed by unsuccess) for these
two conditions. It should be noted that enactment of alternative
methods that utilised the exit door (alternative by way of a novel
tool and/or access point) resulted in the same experience of efﬁ-
cacy as that of the socially demonstrated method.
At the end of testing all children were praised for their perfor-
mance and rewarded with a sticker irrespective of their level of
success (small stickers collected during testing were traded for
one larger and more desirable sticker). The above protocol was fol-
lowed for adult participants in a University laboratory, within
either the 0% or 75% conditions. They received departmental cred-
its for their participation or an Amazon voucher, irrespective of
their performance.
2.5. Coding and inter-rater reliability
The performance of each participant was scored for a number of
variables in each response trial: (a) tool selected, (b) access point
used, (c) exit location (if any), (d) outcome (no outcome, capsule
to exit door but no extraction, and extraction), and (e) learning
strategy. Full rationales for the different strategies are presented
in Section 3 but, in short, the strategy was determined by the afore-
mentioned (a)–(c), such that:
 Imitation = same tool, same access point, and same exit as used
in social demonstrations.
 Tool/access point innovation = different tool and/or access
point, but same exit as used in social demonstrations.1
 Exit innovation = different or same tool/access point, and differ-
ent exit as used in social demonstrations (unlike alterations to
the tool or access point, discovering a new exit has the potential
to change the outcome of the task).
 Unsuccessful action = abandoned attempt prior to removal of
capsule or it reaching the exit door.
From these individual response trial variables, several addi-
Table 2
Attempt trial variables subject to statistical analysis.
Variable Description
Copying ﬁdelity Score of 1–4 was given for each trial: 1 for no new
components (tool/access/exit), 2 for one new
component, 3 for two new components, and 4 for
three new components. These were summed across
the eight attempt trials (max. 32)
Tool/access/exit
innovations
Total number of novel (to the child) tools/access
points/exits used across attempt trials
Imitation attempts Total number of attempts in line with strict imitation
deﬁnition (same tool, access and exit; max. 8)
Tool/access
innovation attempts
Total number of attempts in line with tool/access
point innovation deﬁnition (new tool and/or access,
but same exit; max. 8)
Exit innovation
attempts
Total number of attempts in line with exit innovation
deﬁnition (same or different tool and/or access, and
different exit; max. 8)
Alternative methods Total number of different methods (new
combinations of tool, access and exit) enacted,
excluding socially demonstrated method and
irrespective of success (max. 8)
Extractions Total number of successful capsule extractions,
irrespective of extraction method (max. 8)
Note. Attempts at retrieving the capsule were deemed more revealing than suc-
cessful extractions, as, according to the experimental design of the study, on some
trials the capsule reached the exit door but it was locked and so could not be
extracted. Here, participants’ persistence with an unsuccessful method was evident.
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(Table 2). The experimenter, KC, coded 100% of the sample from
video tape. An independent observer, blind to the hypotheses of
the study, coded 20% of the sample. All Cohen’s Kappa scores and
correlation values were 0.85 or above, showing an excellent level
of inter-rater reliability.
2.6. Statistical methods
As the data were not normally distributed, non-parametric tests
were used. Although we were selective with follow-up tests
(Mann–Whitney and Wilcoxon rank-sum), to avoid inﬂating the
Type I error rate a Bonferroni correction was applied by dividing
the critical signiﬁcance level of .05 by the total number of tests
conducted. Probability values reported with an asterisk indicate
the signiﬁcance level required to reject the null hypothesis follow-
ing this correction.
3. Results
The results are presented in four sections. First, we explore how
control participants’ success and method use compared to that of
100% efﬁcacy social demonstration participants. The 100% condi-
tion is the most valid comparison as the door remained unlocked
for all trials, as it did in the no-demonstration control condition.
The second section considers copying ﬁdelity, broadly deﬁned
and then in relation to typical deﬁnitions of imitation, followed
in the third section by a consideration of deviations from demon-
strated behaviour. Finally, innovation, along with its various man-
ifestations, and its role in low efﬁcacy social conditions is
investigated. As the sex of participants was not found to signiﬁ-
cantly affect our outcome measures, it was excluded from all
reported analyses. All tests are two-tailed unless otherwise stated.
3.1. What were the level of success and methods used by children in
the no-demonstration condition?
Of the 47 controls, nine (19.1%, six males, four 4–5 years and
ﬁve 6–7 years) failed to produce one attempt; instead, they
touched and explored the MMB with their hands but never madecontact with the capsule (despite having the tools introduced at
the beginning of their turn). In comparison, all 209 children from
the social conditions attempted the task (whether successful or
unsuccessful in terms of extraction). 36 of the 47 controls suc-
ceeded in making at least one capsule extraction. However, control
participants achieved signiﬁcantly fewer extractions (Mdn = 5,
SD = 2.56) than those in the 100% condition across the attempt tri-
als (Mdn = 7, SD = 2.09; Mann–Whitney U = 588.50, z = 4.42,
p < .001).
The main point of concern which the control condition allowed
us to address was whether the socially demonstrated method was
a naturally salient response to the task. Of the 38 control partici-
pants who produced at least one attempt, only two produced the
method of social demonstrations on more attempt trials than any
other method. Controls (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.81) also performed the
method of social demonstrations on signiﬁcantly fewer attempt
trials than participants in the 100% condition (Mdn = 6, SD = 2.63;
U = 131.00, z = 8.01, p < .001), whilst attempting a signiﬁcantly
greater number of alternative methods (control: Mdn = 2.5,
SD = 1.61; 100%: Mdn = 1, SD = 1.08; U = 361.00, z = 5.17,
p < .001). Control participants produced a median of 2.5 alternative
methods, thus they did not simply discover one means of solving
the task and adhere to it. Nevertheless, the majority of children
repeated successful methods (N = 30, Mdn = 2, SD = 2.42). Within
the control group, the 8- to 9-year-olds produced a greater median
number of successful alternative methods (Mdn = 3, SD = 1.55)
than 6- to 7-year-olds (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.61) and 4- to 5-year-olds
(Mdn = 1, SD = 1.70).
Whilst any successful method discovered in the
no-demonstration control condition would technically constitute
an innovation, because it is a different kind of innovation to that
required in the social conditions (invention versus modiﬁcation)
it is not possible to compare them like-for-like. Hence, the focus
above is on alternative methods.
3.2. Did children imitate the socially demonstrated method?
Children received a score according to the number of new com-
ponents each attempt contained (explained in Table 2). A score of 1
indicated faithful reproduction of the socially demonstrated
method, whilst 4 indicated complete deviation from this method.
The attempts that had no outcome (they were abandoned, by
extracting the tool from the box before an outcome was produced)
could receive a maximum score of 3 only due to the unknown exit.
A total of 122 participants (58%) produced at least one such aban-
doned attempt and they accounted for 15.6% of all attempts. The
following analyses were run with the abandoned attempts (unsuc-
cessful actions) both included and excluded, with the same effects
found. We report the former.
Analysis of total scores, summed across the eight attempt trials,
revealed no signiﬁcant differences between efﬁcacy conditions
(Kruskal–Wallis H(3) = 2.82, p = .42). Children’s mean scores in all
conditions ranged from 11 to 12.5 (for adults, the overall mean
score was larger at 17.42; range of 22). Given that the minimum
possible score was 8, denoting complete ﬁdelity throughout
attempts, and the maximum 32, children showed little (though
some) deviation from demonstrated behaviour, irrespective of con-
dition. Age differences were found in copying ﬁdelity (H(2) = 12.32,
p = .002). Speciﬁcally, 4- to 5-year-olds showed signiﬁcantly higher
copying ﬁdelity (Mdn = 9, SD = 3.98) than 6- to 7-year-olds
(Mdn = 11, SD = 4.02, U = 1732.5, z = 2.53, p = .01) and 8- to
9-year-olds (Mdn = 11.5, SD = 4.32, U = 1397, z = 3.43, p = .001).
Deﬁnitions of imitation usually require that both the goal, and
the speciﬁc actions used to achieve it, are recognised and repro-
duced (Tomasello, 1990). Such ‘pure’ imitation, involving use of
the fork tool, through the ‘social’ access point, and extraction (or
***
***
Fig. 2. Median number of ‘pure’ imitation attempts by age group. The asterisks above the adult bar denote that these participants were signiﬁcantly different to all other age
groups. ⁄p < .05, ⁄⁄p < .005, ⁄⁄⁄p < .001.
K. Carr et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 322–332 327attempted extraction) from the exit door, was the dominant strat-
egy used on the MMB task. This was seen in participants’ ﬁrst
attempt trial (68% of which met the criteria for ‘pure’ imitation)
and overall (most common strategy across attempt trials for 67%
of children). As the exit door was unlocked for all participants on
the ﬁrst trial, excepting those in the 0% condition for whom it
was always locked, the ﬁrst enactment of the socially demon-
strated method allowed for successful extraction.
In spite of the dominance of this imitation response, it was
mediated by age (H(2) = 8.86, p = .012). The number of imitation
attempts was signiﬁcantly higher for the youngest age group (4–
5 years, N = 59) when compared with 6- to 7-year-olds (Mann
Whitney, N = 78, U = 1758.50, z = 2.41, p = .016) and 8- to
9-year-olds (N = 72, U = 1518.00, z = 2.85, p = .004; see Fig. 2).
The latter two groups did not signiﬁcantly differ (U = 2752.50,
z = 0.21, p = .83), nor did the experimental conditions
(H(3) = 2.54, p = .47). However, an effect of condition was found
for adults, who produced signiﬁcantly more imitation attempts in
the highest (75%) efﬁcacy condition (Mdn = 4, SD = 2.88) compared
with the 0% efﬁcacy condition (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.65): U = 41.50,
z = 5.01, p < .001).3.3. How did the children’s behaviour deviate from the demonstrated
behaviour?
To establish which component of the method (tool, access, exit)
was most likely to be modiﬁed, separate scores were created for
the number of novel tools (maximum 5; hook, sweep, combined
fork, combined sweep, tool end), novel access points (maximum
4; end, dial, dial opposite, entry chute) and novel exits (maximum
3; end, dial, dial opposite) used across the attempt trials (‘novel’
denoting ‘not seen’ in demonstrations, and excluding repetitions).
A signiﬁcant difference was found in method component mod-
iﬁcation or the ‘type’ of innovation (Friedman’s ANOVA
v2(2) = 114.94, p < .001). Speciﬁcally, participants used signiﬁ-
cantly more novel tools throughout their attempt trials (Mdn = 1,
SD = 0.97) than access points (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.93; Wilcoxon
signed-ranks z = 6.35, p < .001) or exits (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.61;
z = 9.21, p < .001). Participants also used signiﬁcantly more novel
access points than novel exits (z = 5.96, p < .001). These ﬁndings
are further reﬂected in the total number of children (out of 209)
who produced at least one of the different innovation types: toolinnovation (N = 132), access innovation (N = 86) and exit innova-
tion (N = 26).
In contrast, adult participants (v2(2) = 13.34, p = .001) used sig-
niﬁcantly more novel exits (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.14) than novel tools
(Mdn = 2, SD = 0.85; z = 2.75, p = .006). There was no signiﬁcant
difference in the use of novel tools and novel access points
(z = 0.18, p = .86), and the difference between novel exits and
novel access points neared signiﬁcance (Mdn = 1, SD = 1.18;
z = 2.22, p = .027, p⁄ = .016). Examining age differences in chil-
dren’s novel exit use, the oldest children (8–9 years: Mdn = 1,
SD = 0.86) were the most proﬁcient (6–7 years: Mdn = 1,
SD = 0.47; 4–5 years: Mdn = 1, SD = 0.28), although the effect is
only nearing signiﬁcance (H(2) = 5.79, p = .055).3.4. Improving behaviour efﬁcacy: The importance of exit innovation
The experimental task was designed such that exit innovations
were the only way in which behaviour could be made more efﬁca-
cious. Whilst modiﬁcations of the tool and access point are innova-
tive departures from demonstrated behaviour, without
modiﬁcation of the exit they are of no more ‘use’ than the modelled
method. Innovations should solve the problem at hand (Carr,
Kendal, & Flynn, under revision). Unlike the exit door, the top
access points of the box are always open and thus can guarantee
extraction success when used as exits. It is for this reason that only
rates of exit innovation were included in the following analyses,
and not rates of tool or access innovation.
Of the 209 child participants within the four social experimen-
tal conditions, only 26 individuals (12.4%) produced at least one
exit innovation (age group differences are reported at the end of
this section). Thus, whilst 10% of children never imitated, 87.6% of
children never innovated. This is in contrast to the 33 of 45 adult
participants (73.3%) who did produce at least one exit innovation.
The disparity between ‘pure’ imitation and exit innovation as
adopted task strategies, across ages, can be seen in Fig. 3.
Correlational analyses, using actual ages and mean number of
attempts, indicated a signiﬁcant negative correlation between imi-
tation and age (rs (254) = 0.35, p < .001) and a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between exit innovation and age (rs (254) = 0.47,
p < .001).
Children’s exit innovations typically appeared around the
fourth attempt trial out of eight (see Table 3), suggesting that
***
* **
***
Fig. 3. Median number of ‘pure’ imitation and exit innovation attempts by age
group. The asterisks above the adult bar denote that these participants were
signiﬁcantly different to all other age groups. ⁄p < .05, ⁄⁄p < .005, ⁄⁄⁄p < .001.
328 K. Carr et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 322–332innovative problem solving was a cumulative process, with each
trial or interaction with the MMB revealing more about its affor-
dances, or that participants opted to explore once they had gained
personal experience of the demonstrated method’s efﬁcacy. A clear
trend of increasing exit innovation with decreasing efﬁcacy of the
demonstrated method was seen. While 23% of children in the 0%
condition (where the exit door never yielded to allow extraction)Table 3
Exit innovations: Participant and innovation characteristics.
Participant characteristics First exit innovation trial N
Age (Years) Sex Condition
4–5 F 0% 1 1
M 0% 8 1
M 0% 2 1
M 25% 6 1
M 25% 5 1
6–7 F 75% 2 1
M 0% 2 3
M 0% 3 1
M 0% 1 2
M 0% 2 1
M 25% 6 1
M 25% 5 1
8–9 F 0% 3 2
F 0% 3 2
F 0% 8 1
F 0% 4 1
F 25% 4 2
F 25% 7 1
F 75% 3 3
F 100% 6 1
F 100% 4 1
M 0% 1 2
M 0% 4 3
M 0% 2 3
M 75% 5 2
M 100% 2 3
Note. ‘Grade’ reﬂects the complexity (3 = most complex) of the novel behaviour as a who
‘Repetitions of exit innovations’ is a count of the number of times a newly discovered ex
innovations were repeated. The ‘new’ in ‘Number of new exit innovations’ relates to the
how many capsules were extracted, only how many of the access points were discovereproduced at least one exit innovation, this was true of only 13%
of children in the 25% condition and 6% of children in the 75%
and 100% conditions.
Each innovation of the 26 individuals was ‘graded’ according to
its complexity, thereby taking into consideration the tool and
access point that accompanied the new exit. Scores were as fol-
lows: (1) new exit only, (2) new exit and new tool or access point,
(3) new exit, new tool and new access point. In addition to grades,
innovations were also categorised by their level. Higher-level inno-
vations were determined by their repetition (and presumed
learned status), deemed to be of cultural signiﬁcance given the
increased likelihood of their successful transmission and acquisi-
tion by others (as opposed to an innovation that is accidental or
remains in the repertoire of only one individual; see Carr, Kendal,
& Flynn, under revision). A low-level innovation is deﬁned as an
‘unlearned chance innovation not repeated by the individual’, to
be contrasted with a mid-level ‘individually learned innovation
repeated by the individual’ (the high-level category, ‘individually
learned innovation that is acquired by others’, does not apply as
this study did not allow for transmission of innovations to other
individuals). The occurrence and number of repetitions, used to
determine the level of the innovation, can be seen in the
right-hand column of Table 3.
There were no signiﬁcant differences in the number of exit
innovation extractions by age group (H(2) = 5.39, p = .07).
However, as Table 3 indicates, there were age differences when
considering exit innovations more closely. Of the ﬁve exit innova-
tors in the 4–5 age group, no one individual discovered more than
one novel exit. The number of individuals doing so increased in the
6–7 group (M = 1.43), and again in the oldest group (M = 2.00).
Moreover, although overall there were very few repetitions of exit
innovations (M = 0.81), adult participants displayed a higher mean
number of exit innovation repetitions (M = 3.21) than childreno. of new exit innovations Grade Repetitions of exit innovations
1 4
1 0
3 0
1 0
3,1 1
2 0
2,3,2,3 1
3 0
3,2 2
1 0
2 0
1 2
1,2 0
1 1
1 0
1 2
1 1
2 0
3 0
2 0
1 2
3 2
3,2,3 0
1,2,3,1 2
2,1 0
3,3,2 1
le (tool, access and exit), and are written in the order in which they were displayed.
it (i.e., not the exit door) was used again. It does not denote how many different exit
child, and excludes the exit door used in social demonstrations. It does not denote
d as exits.
**
Fig. 4. Mean number of exit innovation extractions across child experimental groups. Although non-parametric statistics were conducted, the means are displayed here given
that the median score for each group was 0. ⁄p < .05.
K. Carr et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 322–332 329(M = 0.81), including those of the eldest children (M = 0.79), thus
evidencing more innovations of mid-level status. A variety of
‘grades’ of innovation complexity were seen within each age group.
While the innovations of some participants increased in complex-
ity (progressing from a lower to higher grade during attempt tri-
als), this trend was reversed for others.
Examining the number of exit innovations more widely across
the four experimental groups (children only; Fig. 4), a signiﬁcant
effect of condition was found (Kruskal–Wallis H(3) = 10.82,
p = .01). As it was predicted that those participants in the lowest
efﬁcacy conditions would innovate more than those in the higher
efﬁcacy conditions, a number of follow-up analyses were con-
ducted. The results of these supported our predictions: participants
in the 0% efﬁcacy condition (N = 60, Mdn = 0, SD = 1.40) attained a
signiﬁcantly greater number of innovative extractions than partic-
ipants in the 75% (N = 50, Mdn = 0, SD = 0.52; Mann Whitney
U = 1234.00, z = 2.54, p = .01) and 100% conditions (N = 51,
Mdn = 0, SD = 0.70; U = 1261.50, z = 2.54, p = .01), but not 25%
(N = 48, Mdn = 0, SD = 0.69; U = 1269.00, z = 1.56, p = .12). The
25% condition did not signiﬁcantly differ from the two higher efﬁ-
cacy conditions.
Of the 33 adults who produced one or more exit innovations, 23
belonged to the 0% efﬁcacy condition and 10 to the 75% efﬁcacy
condition. Complementing the effect of condition found for chil-
dren, adult participants in the 0% condition (Mdn = 6.5, SD = 1.83)
attained a signiﬁcantly greater number of innovative extractions
than those in the 75% condition (Mdn = 0, SD = 2.62): U = 63.00,
z = 4.38, p < .001).
In addition to group differences in the performance of exit inno-
vations (including their repetition), we ﬁnd differences in the pro-
duction of exit innovations (new exit innovations only).
Considering only new (to the child) exit innovations, the effect of
condition was again signiﬁcant (Kruskal–Wallis H(3) = 10.63,
p = .01). Participants in the 0% condition produced signiﬁcantly
more new exit innovations across their eight attempt trials
(Mdn = 0, SD = 0.85) than 75% (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.52; U = 1243.00,
z = 2.45, p = .014) and 100% participants (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.46;
U = 1260.5, z = 2.54, p = .011). The effect of age was nearing sig-
niﬁcance (H(2) = 5.79, p = .055) with the older age groups produc-
ing more exit innovations than the youngest group (as also
suggested by Table 3).4. Discussion
Here we addressed the question of how children of different
ages trade-off social versus asocial learning based on the efﬁcacy
of an observed solution. We also considered how innovation,
through modiﬁcation in tool use, develops. Lower levels of
observed solution efﬁcacy were associated with increased (exit)
innovation in children, with older children being more likely to
innovate than younger children. Between 6–7 years and adulthood,
imitation of the socially demonstrated method decreased and
innovation increased. Contrary to expectation, reduced imitation
in response to lower levels of solution efﬁcacy was not found for
children. It was, however, seen in adults.4.1. Fidelity to, and deviations from, the socially demonstrated method
Children reproduced modelled behaviour with high levels of
ﬁdelity across the different efﬁcacy conditions, supporting previ-
ous research indicating imitation is one of the major learning
mechanisms used by children (Hopper et al., 2010; Horner &
Whiten, 2005; Whiten & Flynn, 2010). The pervasiveness of imita-
tion occurred in spite of permission to deviate (‘try anything you
like’) and repetition of the goal (‘see if you can get the egg out of
the box’), alongside explicit linguistic cues as to whether or not
the goal had been achieved. Faithful reproduction of modelled
behaviour cannot be ascribed to task difﬁculty (known to increase
imitation in children: Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011; Williamson
et al., 2008), as the majority of no-demonstration control partici-
pants were able to solve the task asocially. Three possible interpre-
tations remain.
First, children are poor at evaluating efﬁcacy of observed infor-
mation (and indeed personal information when they reproduce the
socially demonstrated method). Although the exit innovation ﬁnd-
ings in the current study stem from a small number of children,
meaning this interpretation cannot be completely ruled out, the
signiﬁcant effect of experimental condition between the 0% and
75/100% groups does not appear to support the notion that chil-
dren are poor at evaluating efﬁcacy, nor do ﬁndings of prior
research (Pasquini et al., 2007). Second, contradicting the actions
of an adult demonstrator, by opting not to reproduce demonstrated
330 K. Carr et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 322–332behaviour, is an unfavourable option for children (due to adults’
general level of perceived competence, Wood et al., 2012, or their
modelling of normative behaviour). Yet previous evidence suggests
that when there is sufﬁcient reason to do so (i.e., the model is unre-
liable, actions are accidental, and behaviour is inefﬁcacious), chil-
dren will deviate (Birch et al., 2008; Carpenter et al., 1998;
Williamson et al., 2008; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum,
2010). Moreover, children were seen to deviate from the adult
demonstrator, principally by trying out different tools (but less
so the crucial exits). The third and ﬁnal interpretation is that gen-
erating novel behaviour (as an alternative to imitation), capable of
successfully altering the outcome of the task, was cognitively
demanding following social demonstrations and that either the
capacity or motivation to do so was lacking. Whilst not mutually
exclusive, we propose that the competence interpretation (solely
or in combination with a normative explanation given below) best
explains the current ﬁndings – especially as the ability to use
(innovate) a new exit increased from 8–9 years into adulthood –
and aligns with previous research (children: Beck et al., 2011; cal-
litrichids: Kendal, Coe, & Laland, 2005).
A number of important developmental progressions were
uncovered in the present study, and suggest that reliance on social
learning mechanisms is in part determined by age. In spite of the
dominant imitation response, age effects were found regarding
ﬁdelity: 4- to 5-year-olds demonstrated more faithful imitation
(enacting this strategy across more attempt trials) than older chil-
dren. Imitation ﬁdelity continued to decrease into adulthood. In
the context of children’s novel puzzle box interactions, wherein
there is an explicit goal (tasks are not causally opaque), imitation
thus appears to increase between the ages of 3 and 5 years
(Flynn & Whiten, 2008; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner,
2007) before plateauing around the age of 6 years (present study).
Consistent with Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, and Tomasello’s
(2010) observation of children deeming adults’ demonstrated
behaviour to be normatively correct, several children remarked,
following demonstrations, ‘so that’s how you play the game’. This
indication of rule learning or convention acquisition, together with
children’s general reluctance to depart from demonstrated beha-
viour, suggests normativity had a part to play in the ﬁndings. The
age-driven decline in imitation could be facilitated by an
age-driven decline in normativity and, relatedly, conformity
(Walker & Andrade, 1996). Conformity also appears to be reduced
for children, from the age of four years, when making judgements
in more objective and less socially arbitrary domains (judging
object functions as opposed to object labels; Schillaci & Kelemen,
2014).
4.2. Exit innovation: The rate and inﬂuence of observed behaviour
efﬁcacy
In line with cultural evolution theory (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;
Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and previous experimental studies
(Whiten & Flynn, 2010), in the current study a small minority of
innovators emerged from a large population of ‘followers’. Exit
innovations were produced by only 26 of 209 children following
social demonstrations. The majority of children failed to recognise
that exit innovations represented the sole way in which behaviour
could be made more efﬁcacious, such that a focus on behavioural
means (tools used) as opposed to behavioural outcome prevailed
(it could also be that the tools were highly salient to the children,
by being the ﬁrst object that was selected by the demonstrator, but
less so to the more experienced adults). Those who continued with
the socially demonstrated method when it was never efﬁcacious
(0% condition) or rarely efﬁcacious (25% condition) may have found
the social afﬁliation function of imitation (Over & Carpenter, 2012)
rewarding. In future, it would be interesting to introduce acompetition element whereby children would be encouraged to
gain more stickers than the demonstrator.
Functional ﬁxedness is a unique challenge for artefact tasks,
and may account for the rarity of innovation. It describes a phe-
nomenon whereby an object’s known conventional function pre-
vents an appreciation of its alternative uses (German & Defeyter,
2000); in the case of the MMB, the top access points convention-
ally function as tool entrances, not capsule exits. The somewhat
counter-intuitive developmental trend of functional ﬁxedness
(affecting 7-year-olds to a greater extent than 5-year-olds;
Defeyter, Avons, & German, 2007) likely impedes the emergence
of innovation; hampering its production just at the time that
increasing cognitive ﬂexibility may better enable it. Although
innovation increased with age, exit innovators were nevertheless
very rare amongst even the oldest child age group. Executive
functions may have a similar limiting effect. Inhibitory control
skills develop signiﬁcantly in the preschool years, but children
do not show mature or advanced levels of performance in some
executive abilities until aged 9–10 years or above (e.g., action
inhibition: Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister, & Riggs, 2013; planning;
Tecwyn, Thorpe, & Chappell, 2014). Together with the
late-developing inductive reasoning, permitting a variety of infer-
ences to be made about a single item that ﬁts multiple categories
(Bright & Feeney, 2014), inhibiting prepotent responses and con-
sidering multiple possible outcomes prior to action will surely
better enable innovation. With age, our participants became less
restricted in their exit innovation capabilities – perhaps indicat-
ing the requirement for mature executive functions and more
general cognitive maturity and ﬂexibility to overcome the
functional ﬁxedness obstacle.
Rates of exit innovation increased from 8–9 years and were
inﬂuenced by observed behaviour efﬁcacy. Participants who expe-
rienced the lowest level of solution efﬁcacy (the exit door was
always locked) produced a greater number of innovative extrac-
tions than participants with a 75% or 100% level of observed solu-
tion efﬁcacy. These latter two conditions were arguably the least
conducive to innovation since they provided participants with a
solution that always, or nearly always, worked. Yet, innovation is
not just about solving a problem but exploring the world also.
Indeed, Wood et al. (2013a) discovered that children are motivated
to acquire multiple solutions to a problem even without the poten-
tial of a greater reward. In the current study, the 75% and 100% par-
ticipants could plausibly afford to explore more than the 25% or 0%
participants in the knowledge that they already have a functional
method in their repertoire, meaning potentially better ways of
accomplishing the goal could be sought. It may be that children’s
performance was inﬂuenced by an adult model-based bias (a pup-
pet was used for demonstrations in Wood et al.), but an alternative
interpretation is suggested by the adult ﬁndings. Of the 12 adult
participants who did not produce an exit innovation, 11 belonged
to the 75% condition. Given that adults are not cognitively con-
strained in the same manner as children, it appears that they
deduced no necessity in deviating from the socially demonstrated
method when it was largely functional. Therefore, our results show
it was likely necessity, not opportunity (implicated in the innova-
tive tool use of various non-human primate species; Koops,
Visalberghi, & van Schaik, 2014), that drove participants to
innovate.
Individual learning from performing (exit) innovations was evi-
denced in two ways: repetition of an innovation, and/or production
of more than one innovation. According to the former criteria, 10 of
the 26 child exit innovators produced low-level innovations where
there was no evidence of learning (note, however, that two of these
individuals produced an exit innovation on the eighth trial, pre-
venting subsequent assessment of learning). The greater propen-
sity for innovation repetitions in adults (only 2 out of 33
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sophisticated learning and executive processes, but also at a poten-
tial disparity in approach to the MMB task. It is possible that adults
were more goal-directed, prioritising the extraction of the capsule
over the attempt trials, whereas children, when they chose to devi-
ate from the social method and explore, did so in a more playful
and ‘random’ manner. This is supported also by the varying com-
plexities, or ‘grades’, of innovations when they were produced by
the children. As an aside, in the context of the MMB task we cannot
necessarily ascribe greater theoretical signiﬁcance to exit innova-
tions that were accompanied by a novel tool and/or access point:
the latter do not improve behaviour efﬁcacy. However, in other
contexts, innovation across all components may be regarded as
more insightful. Returning to the exit innovation ﬁndings, given
children’s capacity to incorporate newly presented task solutions
into their behavioural repertoires (Wood et al., 2013a), we propose
that it was the generation of alternative solutions as opposed to the
switching between themwhich created difﬁculties with the current
task.
4.3. Implications
Comparing our ﬁndings with those of Beck et al. (2011), where
children succeeded at a novel hook invention task around 8 years
of age, we provisionally suggest that innovation by modiﬁcation
and innovation by novel invention have somewhat distinct devel-
opmental trajectories. However, this can only be conﬁrmed with
further research including a variety of tasks. We also posit that,
whilst innovation of any form is made challenging by a lack of cer-
tain cognitive abilities (particularly higher-level executive func-
tions), individuals attempting innovation by modiﬁcation are
especially vulnerable to a canalisation or conservatism effect of
prior social demonstrations. This is manifest in functional ﬁxed-
ness in tool-use tasks. Whilst the indication is that the task was
more difﬁcult in the absence of prior social demonstrations (fewer
capsules were extracted in the no-demonstration than 100% condi-
tion), without these prior demonstrations participants were more
exploratory and attempted a greater number of alternative task
methods. Wood et al. (2013a) and Bonawitz et al. (2011) have sim-
ilarly found observation and pedagogy to lead to restricted explo-
ration and learning. The cost of quick and ‘cheap’ social
information acquisition is ultimately behavioural canalisation:
becoming stuck on a particular method, and in turn blind to poten-
tial alternatives. Reducing the social context in experiments, to
ascertain the extent to which innovation is inhibited by pedagogy,
remains an imperative objective.
Laland (2004, p. 11) speculated that, ‘If innovation is risky and
associated with costs, then it is likely to be employed as a last
resort. . . when socially learned strategies have proven unproduc-
tive’. Though there was no indication that innovation would be
risky or costly for those in the low efﬁcacy conditions of the cur-
rent study (when the socially demonstrated method was unsuc-
cessful and the reward could not be retrieved), our ﬁndings of
rare and limited innovation, even in older and more competent
individuals, do indeed suggest that children employ innovation
as a last resort.
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